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Abstract
While examining the macroeconomic eﬀects of increased govern-
ment control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector
general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heteroge-
nous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how
wage setting and unemployment is aﬀected by punishment policies,
which is ignored in the previous literature.
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1 Introduction
Some goods are produced in both the formal and the informal sector. A given
worker faces a decision of whether to perform his activities in the formal or
the informal sector. When making that decision, the worker compares net
payoﬀs and employment perspectives in the two sectors. Considering this
sectorial choice, one question emerges: why do not all workers apply for jobs
in either the formal- or the informal sector? Why do both sectors exist?
One prominent explanation is that workers diﬀer in moral. Entering the
informal sector is associated with moral costs. Some workers have higher
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1moral preventing them from performing illegal work. Other workers have
lower moral and enter the informal sector gladly. The informal sector then
consists of low-moral workers and the formal sector consists of high-moral
workers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how a larger control of the in-
formal sector aﬀects the size of the informal sector, wages, unemployment
and welfare. To that end, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium model
featuring matching frictions, heterogenous workers in terms of moral, worker-
ﬁrm wage bargains, and endogenous sector division.
Although there has been a recent explosion of the literature on tax eva-
sion and tax avoidance, the research is mainly carried out within the public
ﬁnance tradition.1 In this literature wages are either assumed to be ﬁxed or
determined by market clearing.2
The main novelty of this paper is to incorporate an imperfectly compet-
itive labour market. This facilitates an analysis of how punishment policies
aﬀect wage setting and unemployment. Previous literature on tax evasion
has either assumed that wages are ﬁxed or determined by market clearing,
which obvious is an inadequate framework to use when analyzing how tax
evasion opportunities aﬀect wage setting and unemployment.
2T h e M o d e l 3
The economy consists of two sectors producing a homogenous good; a formal
sector and an informal sector.
We assume that workers have moral considerations. There is a distri-
bution of moral values, m, in the economy, m ∈ [0,1] . For simplicity we
assume the distribution to be uniform. Moral costs of applying for a job in
the informal sector, is denoted c(m),w h e r ec0(m) > 0.
2.1 Matching
We assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs.
The matching functions for the formal and informal sectors are
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two recent
surveys.
2An exception is Chang and Lai (1996) who examines the relationship between un-
derreporting of income and total tax revenues taking into account the eﬃciency wage
hypothesis.








where uj and vj,j = F,I are the unemployment- and vacancy rates for the
two sectors. The rates are deﬁned as the numbers relative to the sector labour
forces. The total labour force is normalized to unity, which is divided into
the two sectors. The worker’s and ﬁrm’s transition rates are λ
j = Xj/uj = ¡
θ
j¢1−η
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is labour market tightness.
2.2 The formal and the informal sector
The present discounted values of unemployment, UF and UI, and employ-
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where r is the exogenous discount rate; wj,j= F,I denotes wages in the two
sectors; s is the exogenous separation rate; t is the proportional income tax
rate; p is the rate at which an informal worker is detected by the government,
and δ is the proportion of the evaded income the worker has to pay as a
punishment fee if detected. For simplicity, we assume that unemployment
beneﬁts are equal to zero.
The informal worker faces the separation rate s+p as he may be separated
from his job due to an exogenous market separation or due to detection. The
moral cost is paid by all informal workers as applying for a job in this sector
involves moral considerations.
Firms in the two sectors are characterized by the arbitrage equations:
rJ









j) − k,j = F,I, (6)
where Jj and V j give the value of a ﬁlled- and unﬁlled job; ωj,j = F,I,
where ωF = wF (1 + z) and ωI = wI (1 + pα) denote producer wages in the
two sectors; z i st h ep a y r o l lt a xr a t ea n dα is the proportion of the evaded
wage the informal ﬁrm has to pay as a punishment fee if detected. The
marginal productivity of manual workers is y. Hiring costs are denoted k.
32.2.1 Wage determination
Wages solve ﬁrst order conditions from the Nash Bargaining Solutions with


















1−pδ are the tax- and punishment wedges.
By use of equation (1)-(6) in equation (7), and assuming free entry,









2.2.2 Labour Market Tightness
Labour market tightness for the two sectors are determined by equations (5)
and (6) using the free entry condition and the wage equations (8):
k (r + s)
qF =( 1 − γ)y − γθ
Fk, (9)
k (r + s + p)




I since s + p>s .
2.2.3 Unemployment
Steady state employment- and unemployment rates are derived by consider-
ing the ﬂows into and out of employment. The unemployment rates, uF and









s + p + λ
I. (12)
The total number of unemployed workers are given by:
UTOT = u
F (1 − ˆ m)+u
I ˆ m. (13)
where 1 − ˆ m and ˆ m deﬁnes the sector labour forces.
42.3 Sector Division
Workers enter the unemployment pool and choose whether to apply for
formal- or informal jobs. In making the choice they compare the values
of being in the two sectors. The marginal worker, ˆ m, is indiﬀerent between
entering the formal- or the informal sector, i.e., rUF = rUI. Rewrite the












= c(ˆ m), (14)
Workers with low moral, m 5 ˆ m, become informal workers whereas work-
e r sw i t hh i g hm o r a l ,m>ˆ m, become formal workers. Hence ˆ m and 1 − ˆ m
resolve the labour forces in the two sectors. For the informal sector to exist,
ˆ m>0,w en e e dt h a t θI
θF > ψ. Put diﬀerently, the wage premium for workers
employed in the informal sector has to be large enough to counteract that
the expected time spent in unemployment is lower in the formal sector.4
3 Comparative Statics
We consider the impact of the punishment system (higher audit rate, p,
or higher punishment fees,α or δ) on tightness, equilibrium producer wages,
unemployment rates, the number of unemployed workers, and sector division.
We regard fully ﬁnanced changes, that is, the tax rates t and z adjust in order
























It is straightforward to verify propositions 1-5 by diﬀerentiating the equa-
tions determining the equilibrium variables (presented in section 2) as well
as equation (15) with respect to the policy variables, p,α,δ,tand z.
The eﬀects on the equilibrium variables are summarized in the following
propositions.
Proposition 1 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate, p, will have no
impact on formal tightness, θ
F, and reduce informal tightness, θ
I.B o t hθ
F
and θ
I are unaﬀected by fully ﬁnanced changes in the punishment rates, δ,
or α.
4For the informal sector to have a wage premium, ψ < 1 needs to hold. This is also in
line with what we observe empirically (see Pedersen and Smith (1998)). More details on
existence are given in appendix B.
5When the audit rate increases, the expected duration of an informal
match decreases. It is therefore less proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to open informal
vacancies, whereby vacancies relative unemployed workers in the informal
sector decreases.
Proposition 2 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate, p, will have no
impact on formal producer wages, ωF, and reduce informal producer wages,
ωI.B o t hωF and ωI are unaﬀected by a fully ﬁnanced increase in the pun-
ishment rates, δ and α.
When the audit rate increases, informal tightness decreases, whereby
lower hiring costs are induced. Hence informal producer wages decrease.
Proposition 3 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate, p, will have no
impact on the formal unemployment rate, uF,a n di n c r e a s et h ei n f o r m a ls e c -
tor unemployment rate, uI. Neither uF and uI are aﬀected by a fully ﬁnanced
increase in the punishment rates, δ and α.
The informal unemployment rate increases for two reasons. A higher
audit rate increases the separation rate in the informal sector. A higher p
also reduces sector tightness and thereby reduces the unemployed worker’s
transition rate into informal sector employment. Both eﬀects increase the
informal unemployment rate.
Next, we consider the impact on the sector division. Since ˆ m is aﬀected by
changes in t and z, we have to account for repercussions of tax adjustments
on ˆ m. Changes in the tax- and punishment system aﬀects the government
revenue in a number of ways.5 We focus on the case when we are located
on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curve, in the sense that dynamic
adjustments in equilibrium wages, employment rates and labour force are
not dominating the direct eﬀects; an increase in the audit rate, p,o rt h e
punishment fees, α and δ, then calls for reductions in the tax rates in order
to maintain a balanced budget.
Proposition 4 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate or the punishment
rates, p, α,a n dδ, will reallocate workers towards the formal sector considered
that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curve.
An increase in the audit rate reduces the size of the underground economy
since both consumer wages and employment perspectives in the informal
sector are reduced. Increased punishment fees reduce the informal sector by
5See appendix A for details.
6reducing the sector consumer wages. The reduced taxation of the formal
sector reinforces the reallocation of workers towards the formal sector by
increasing formal consumer wages.
Proposition 5 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate, p, has an ambigu-
ous impact on total unemployment, UTOT,w h e r e a saf u l l yﬁnanced increase
in the punishment rates, α or δ,r e d u c e sUTOT considered that we are located
on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curve.
Ah i g h e rp induces a reallocation of workers towards formal employment
reducing total unemployment as the unemployment rate is relatively smaller
in the formal sector. However, the unemployment rate in the informal sector
increases which tends to raise total unemployment. The overall eﬀect on
unemployment of an increase in the audit rate is hence ambiguous. An
increase in the punishment rates, α and δ, will unambiguously reduce total
unemployment since only the reallocation eﬀe c ti sa tw o r k .
4W e l f a r e
This section is concerned with welfare eﬀects of punishment systems. We

























Welfare depends on both the welfare generated in each sector and the
allocation of workers across the two sectors. There are no welfare eﬀects
from changes in sectorial division, ∂W
∂ ˆ m = WI (ˆ m)−W F =0 , as both workers
and ﬁrms are unaﬀected. Workers are indiﬀerent between the two states
since the moral costs equal the expected gain of informal sector work for
these workers. Firms make zero proﬁts in the long run.
Proposition 6 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the audit rate, p, will reduce
welfare whereas higher punishment rates, α and δ, will have no impact on
welfare.
T h ep r o p o s i t i o nc a nb ev e r i ﬁed by diﬀerentiating (15) and (16) with re-
spect to the policy variables, p,α,δ,t and z and using the previous proposi-
tions.
A higher audit rate implies lower welfare as welfare for the informal sector
is reduced, because the increase in the unemployment rate is dominating the
increased welfare due to lower hiring costs.
6The government budget is balanced at all times.
75C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that increased government control of the underground econ-
omy in terms of more frequent auditing will reduce the size of the under-
ground economy. The reason is that employment perspectives and relative
consumer wages in the informal sector are reduced. Furthermore, increased
auditing reduces welfare since employment perspectives in the informal sector
are reduced and the reallocation of workers leaves welfare unaﬀected. There
is an ambiguous impact on overall unemployment as the reduced employment
perspectives in the informal sector are counteracted by the fact that workers
reallocate towards the formal sector where the unemployment rate is lower.
Higher punishment fees reduce the size of the underground economy, do not
aﬀect welfare and reduce overall unemployment.
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85.1 Appendix A: Impact on revenue
Diﬀerentiating the government budget constraint in (15) with respect to p





































































































































,x 2 = t,z,
w h e r ew ec a nd i v i d et h ei n ﬂuences on the government revenue into four
categories characterized by each row in the two equations. The ﬁrst row in
each equation captures how revenues are altered by the change in the number
of workers choosing the informal sector. The second row in equation (17)
captures how revenues are inﬂuenced by changes in the equilibrium producer
wage for informal sector workers. The third row in equation (17) gives the
impact on revenues due to employment changes for informal sector workers.
Finally, the fourth row in equation (17) and the second row in equations (18)
and (19) gives the direct eﬀect.
Consider ﬁrst how revenues change with an increase in audit rate, p (cf.
equation (17). From the discussion in section 3 we concluded that the number
of informal sector workers decreases with a higher audit rate. Revenues
then increase to the extent that formal sector workers pay more taxes than
informal sector workers pay in punishment fees. The second row encapsulates
that a higher audit rate implies lower informal sector producer wages, the
9government revenues fall. Since the employment rate for informal sector
workers decreases, the government revenues fall. Finally, the direct eﬀect
will always increase revenues.
Since the dynamic eﬀects move in diﬀerent directions it is diﬃcult to
determine whether they reinforce or weaken the direct eﬀect. However, we
assume that we are located on the upward sloping part of the Laﬀer curve
and hence the dynamics eﬀects will never dominate the direct eﬀect.
Analogous reasoning can be conducted for equation (18). We derived that
the number of informal sector workers decreases with higher punishment fees.
Revenues then increase to the extent that formal sector workers pay more
taxes than informal sector workers pay in punishment fees. The direct eﬀect
will always increase revenues.
Finally, from equation (19) we observe that the reallocation eﬀect between
the two sectors tends to decrease revenues if formal sector workers pay more
taxes than informal sector workers pay in punishment fees, whereas the direct
eﬀect increases revenues.
5.2 Appendix B: Existence of ˆ m
We observe that for the informal sector to exist, that is for ˆ m to be positive,
we need that labour market tightness in the informal sector relatively to
labour market tightness in the formal sector is larger than the wedge, θI
θF >
ψ. Put diﬀerently, the wage premium for workers employed in the informal
sector has to be large enough to counteract that the expected time spent in
unemployment is lower in the formal sector.
Consider the speciﬁc matching function where η = 1
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The smaller p is, the smaller is the diﬀerence between the two labour
market tightness, and hence the more likely it is that the condition is satis-
ﬁed. The more p increases, the less attractive the informal sector becomes
as employment opportunities are diminished and wages are reduced in the
informal sector. The left hand side therefore decreases in p. The right hand
side, on the other hand, increases in p. Hence, there exists a value for the
audit rate, p∗, for which for p ∈ (0,p ∗) the informal sector exists and for
which p ∈ (p∗,1) the informal sector does not exist. Empirically the informal
sector exists, wherefore we concentrate on the former range.
10Furthermore, for a given distribution of morals, the form of the cost
function, c(m), will be determinate for the size of the informal sector relative
to the formal sector. We assume that the cost function is such that c(1) = ∞
to guarantee the existence of a formal sector. Ceteris paribus, both a high
audit rate and high moral costs cause a small informal sector.
11